The two major combat arms of the Egyptian army were chariotry and infantry. The chariot corps was organized into squadrons of 25 machines, each commanded by a "charioteer of the residence." Larger units of 50 and 150 machines could be rapidly assembled and deployed in concert with larger ground units. The chariot corps was supported logistically by special units and staffs, including mobile repair stations and parts depots, whose task it was to keep the machines operational even when deployed. The fact that the pharaoh was usually pictured as leading a chariot charge clearly indicates that it was the elite striking arm of the Egyptian field force.
The infantry was organized into regiments of 200 men, each regiment identified by the type of weapon it carried. Units were further identified as being comprised of recruits, trained men, and elite shock troops. Each regiment was commanded by a "standard bearer." Below him in rank was the "greatest of fifty," who commanded a unit probably like a platoon. These platoons comprised a regiment, and several regiments were commanded by a "captain of a troop," who seems to have functioned as a brigade commander. Above this was a "lieutenant commander of the army," who was answerable to a senior general, often a royal prince, at division level. After the fall of Rome in the fifth century, European armies did not reach this same level of organization for more than a thousand years.
The administrative structure of the army was reformed and, we may presume, it was as highly bureaucratized as are today's armies. The Egyptians, after all, were remarkable record keepers. The army had its own professional scribes, the equivalent of the modern administrative officer. Logistical support was especially well-organized as befits an army that was expected to operate over long distances from its home base. Supplies were moved over hostile territory by ox-cart, and the Egyptians were absolute masters at integrating naval support into their ground operations. Then, as now, more supplies could be moved in a few ships than could possibly be carried by a ground army on the march.
The tactics of the Egyptian army were very well developed and supported by an excellent strategic and field intelligence apparatus. Tactical expertise was increased by the presence of a trained professional officer corps quite accustomed to maneuvering various types of large units over different types of terrain. The Egyptian army employed agents and patrolling techniques similar to those used in modern armies to gather tactical intelligence, and were adept at moving their armies across hostile terrain without being detected. They also utilized counterintelligence and deception in order to gain maximum surprise. Prior to the formulation of final battle plans the Egyptians routinely used the commander's conference, in which the pharaoh presented his battle plan while senior officers were expected to give frank and open advice. The result of these practices was sound battle tactics that allowed Thutmose III to conduct 17 major battle campaigns and win them all.
On the battlefield Egyptian forces usually deployed chariots to act as a screen for infantry. Engaging the enemy with the long-range composite bow, the chariots began killing at a distance and then smashed the enemy formations by shock. If the enemy gave ground, reserve chariot units could be used to exploit the weakness or, more commonly, infantry units could be brought into play in an effort to further disrupt enemy formations. The mobility allowed by a light, highly- maneuverable chariot (the Egyptian chariot was so light that two men could carry it across a stream) allowed the use of mobile reserves for the first time in warfare. These could be committed at a propitious moment to turn a flank or exploit a breakthrough. Once a rout began, the chariot archers could engage in ruthless, rapid, and lethal pursuit. If tactical surprise had been achieved, as at Megiddo, chariot forces could engage an enemy that had not yet deployed for battle. If something went wrong, as at Kadesh, chariots could be used to rescue a desperate situation.
The battle of Meggido (Armaggedon in the Bible) demonstrated all the characteristics of a modern army in battle. Thutmose III moved his army of 20,000 men from Egypt to Gaza, a distance of 250 miles, in less than 9 days and did so undetected. He immediately undertook another 10-day forced march to Yehem, near the village of Aruna, where he prepared to cross the mountains into enemy territory. Thutmose had to choose among three routes, two of which were easy marches but longer distances. The third was through a narrow defile but much shorter. Yet, this route would have placed the army in jeopardy since it would be strung out in file on the march and, if ambushed, would have been unable to defend itself. Thutmose's senior officers advised against the third route. Thutmose's intelligence units learned that the enemy was deployed to protect the easier routes. In a bold gamble, Thutmose risked security for surprise. Taking the dangerous route, he arrived completely undetected outside the city of Megiddo, where he faced only a screening force of enemy soldiers. The result was a smashing victory which would have been complete had the Egyptian troops not lost their discipline and stopped to plunder the defeated enemy's camp.
The battle of Megiddo provides an example of an army that utilized every major tactical device used by modern armies. Thutmose took advantage of his intelligence-gathering capacity and located the deployment of the enemy force. Using this information, he was able to achieve tactical surprise and to mass his forces at the point of the enemy's greatest weakness. He achieved flexibility of deployment by tailoring his units accordingly, and used his chariots to maximize his force at the point of attack (the schwerpunkt ). His reserves were deployed to rescue the situation if things went wrong, as they did for Ramses II in 1295 at Kadesh, where a rescue force of Egyptian chariots prevented a disaster. Thutmose maintained excellent communications along the route of march by messengers and semaphore flags and, when engaged, used trumpets, flags, and horse messengers to coordinate the battle in much the same way as Wellington did at Waterloo.
The Egyptian army lacked only cavalry formations, an innovation that would be introduced 600 years later by the Assyrian army. The failure of the Egyptians to develop cavalry remains a mystery in light of their knowledge of the horse that they obtained from the Hyksos. Perhaps it was a case of an army emphasizing one item of "heavy" equipment (the chariot) that worked so well that it saw no need for a "lighter" and more maneuverable "vehicle" such as the horse. But in almost every other respect the army of Thutmose III and later warrior- pharaohs was a modern army capable of conducting military operations in a modern manner, including the ability to mount seaborne invasions and to use naval forces in conjunction with ground forces for supply and logistics.
No comments:
Post a Comment